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Abstract
This article responds to and extends the commentaries offered in response to our focal article on learning agility.
After summarizing the basic themes in the commentaries, we use this response to clarify points that were unclear
in our original article and push back on certain points raised in a few of the responses. In particular, we reframe
the rigor–relevance debate from an ‘‘either–or’’ to a ‘‘both–and’’ discussion, clarify the relationship between
learning agility and ability to learn, explain how learning agility in organizations moves beyond cognition, and
describe how exchanges such as the one we have collectively engaged in here are central to progressing the
scientific study on learning agility and its effective use in practice.
We sincerely appreciate the responders’
thoughtful and stimulating remarks in
response to our focal article on the con-
ceptual clarity and theoretical grounding
of the learning agility construct (DeRue,
Ashford, & Myers, 2012). As a collection,
the commentaries highlight important gaps
in our model of learning agility and sur-
face important questions that need to be
addressed as the scientific study on learn-
ing agility and its use in practice move
forward. Although we might have to agree
to disagree on certain issues, we are truly
encouraged by the quality of discourse and
thank everyone involved in the exchange.
Some of the commentaries offer provoca-
tive extensions to our conceptualization of
learning agility. For example, Mitchinson,
Gerard, Roloff, and Burke (2012) empha-
size a need to clarify ‘‘learning’’ as much
as the need to clarify ‘‘agility.’’ Carette and
Anseel (2012) situate epistemic motivation
as an underlying psychological mechanism
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of agile learning. Johnson and Scott (2012)
introduce action identification as an addi-
tional cognitive mechanism that underlies
and facilitates learning agility. Vandewalle
(2012) submits implicit person theory as
an additional antecedent to learning agility.
Finally, Beck (2012) challenges us to con-
sider the inter- and intrapersonal aspects
of learning agility by looking at within
and between variance in learning agility
over time. All these commentaries extend
our conceptualization and theory of learn-
ing agility in important ways, and future
research should incorporate these insights
to develop a more comprehensive theory of
learning agility.
Other commentaries challenge us to fur-
ther refine our conceptualization of learning
agility, consider what is novel or unique
about the construct, and surface important
questions and tensions related to construct
and predictive validity. These are impor-
tant questions that will determine whether
learning agility is a passing fad or a con-
struct with staying power. For this reason,
we use this response to comment on sev-
eral themes that seem particularly important
to advancing the scientific study on learn-
ing agility and its use in practice. First, we
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reframe the rigor–relevance debate from an
‘‘either–or’’ to a ‘‘both–and’’ discussion.
Second, we attempt to clarify our think-
ing about the relationship between learning
agility and the broader conceptual space
of ability to learn. Third, we explain how
learning agility can offer more than ‘‘old
wine in new bottles’’ by moving beyond
cognition as we consider learning agility as
it takes place in organizations. Finally, we
consider whether our conceptualization of
learning agility truly is a jingle, a jangle, or
a progression of science that could provide
significant benefit to practice.
Rigor and Relevance: A False
Dilemma?
Several commentaries make explicit or
implicit reference to a classic contention
that theoretical and conceptual rigor come
at the expense of practical relevance.
For example, De Meuse, Dai, Swisher,
Eichinger, and Lombardo (2012) stated,
‘‘A narrow definition of learning agility
such as the one provided by DeRue et al.
may have the advantage of conceptual
clarity but provides limited practical value.’’
Similarly, Mitchinson et al. (2012) noted,
‘‘what is gained in clarity and rigor may
come at the cost of practicality.’’ We
contend that the rigor–relevance divide
is a false dilemma that undermines the
ultimate, shared goal of understanding why
and how some people are more effective
than others at learning from experience. We
agree with Gulati (2007, p. 775) who states,
‘‘I firmly believe that the either/or debate
is moot: our goal should be to seek rigor
and relevance through boundary-spanning
research focused squarely on phenomena
of interest to managers.’’
At the heart of the debate between
rigor and relevance are issues of validity,
in particular the relative importance of
predictive validity versus construct validity.
We can probably all agree that prediction
without understanding is insufficient. We
can also probably agree that conceptual
clarity and construct validity without the
ability to predict outcomes is insufficient.
Where we seem to differ is regarding the
importance of conceptual clarity and its
role in fostering greater understanding of
the relationships we observe in practice.
We think such clarity is essential. Taking
the Choices Architect® measure as an
example, the available data suggest that
it is positively related to key outcomes,
but with this measure, do we understand
why or how this is the case? The content
of the Choices Architect® measure strays
away from Eichinger and Lombardo’s
original definition of the learning agility
construct—for example, how are items
such as ‘‘Is more a credit giver and sharer
than a taker,’’ ‘‘People feel more confident
when this person is in charge,’’ or ‘‘Can
build and manage a high-performing team’’
part of learning agility? Importantly, it
has also strayed into including aspects of
performance in the Choices Architect®
measure itself (‘‘Has often pulled off
things with limited resources’’). Is it ivory
tower ‘‘rigor’’ to suggest that we keep
the performance outcomes that we hope
learning agility will predict out of our
measure of learning agility? We think
not. We think it is rigor that serves
relevance. If we create conceptual clarity
and measures that reflect that clarity, then
when we observe a positive correlation,
we can more confidently attribute it as a
consequence of learning agility and not a
methodological artifact. With the current
Choices Architect® scale, we cannot.
De Meuse et al. (2012) seem to suggest
that there is inverse relationship between
conceptual clarity and practical value. We
respectfully and fundamentally disagree. It
is true that narrowing the definition and
conceptualization of learning agility could
result in a more precise measure that
explains less total variance than the more
general and less well-defined measures that
exist today. However, with increased con-
ceptual clarity and a more valid measure of
the construct, we would actually under-
stand the variance that we do explain
better. It is our belief that practical value
increases with increased understanding,
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and conceptual clarity and rigor are fun-
damental to foster greater understanding.
Gulati (2007) ends his essay with the sug-
gestion that a starting point for bridging this
pseudo-divide is to promote constructive
dialog between academics and practition-
ers. As Gulati (quoting Weick, 2001, p. 71)
notes, there is need for movement on both
sides, that ‘‘the relevance gap decried by
academics and managers alike is ‘as much
a product of practitioners wedded to gurus
and fads as it is of academics wedded to
abstractions and fundamentals’’’ (p. 781).
We hope the current exchange is a first step
in an ongoing dialog about the meaning
and value of learning agility.
Part Versus Whole: The
Conceptual Status of Learning
Agility and Learning Ability
A second strong reaction among some of
our responders was to our central point
about the need to portray learning agility
more accurately as a part, but only a
part, of a larger construct of learning
ability. In our minds, three things get
confused in the literature on learning
agility: learning from experience, learning
ability, and learning agility. De Muese
et al. (2012) portray anything that predicts
learning from experience as learning ability
(and at times learning agility). Likewise,
Hezlett and Kuncel (2012) equate learning
ability and learning agility quite specifically.
In contrast, we believe there is value in
keeping these three concepts distinct. We
agree that we should all hope for more
learning from experience; where we part
ways is in thinking that anything that
predicts learning should be called learning
agility. We strongly contend that both
theory and practice are not well served by
equating learning agility with the totality of
experiential learning or equating learning
agility with all that makes up learning
ability. Agility is only one aspect of the
overall ability to learn from experience, and
as we define in our focal article, we believe
there is value in focusing on the unique
contribution of agility as referencing the
speed and flexibility of learning.
Learning from experience, like many
outcomes studied in our field, is a function
of both ability and motivation. The ability to
learn, in turn, is likely made up of a cluster of
related abilities, including learning agility,
the ability to regulate emotions, and
relevant abilities in self- and interpersonal
awareness, among others. This cluster
interacts with individuals’ motivation to
learn such that a learning-agile individual
may not learn much in a given context
if she is not motivated to learn from the
experience. Yet, this does not mean that our
construct of learning agility needs to contain
this motivation; rather, it merely suggests
that the two are interdependent factors that
interact to affect individuals’ learning from
experience. In other words, the utility of one
is partially dependent on the other (Baron
& Kenny, 1986), but they are not the same,
and lumping them together muddies our
understanding and reduces the conceptual
utility of the construct.
Clearly articulating the conceptual bound-
aries of the learning agility construct is
also crucial for the practical utility of the
concept, something of great importance
to many of our responders. As Mitchin-
son et al. (2012) note, ‘‘it is important that
we continue to measure learning agility in
a way that is accessible and adds value to
selection and development efforts in organi-
zations.’’ Although these authors and others
(particularly De Meuse et al., 2012) use this
claim as a basis for refuting our conceptu-
alization of learning agility, we argue that
a narrower, more precise definition can in
fact add more value to organizational selec-
tion and development efforts. Specifically,
a precise conceptualization and focused
measure of learning agility will allow orga-
nizations to identify the incremental value-
add of learning agility relative to other facets
of overall learning ability (and compare
their relative validity with other nonabil-
ity predictors of learning from experience).
Creating and using precise measures of all
facets of ability and nonability predictors
of learning from experience (or importing
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established scales) allows organizations to
more reliably and effectively predict perfor-
mance and select ‘‘high potentials.’’ Indeed,
in the space and time taken by the 80-
item Choices Architect® measure, or the
116 items of the new viaEDGE measure
described by De Meuse et al., a number of
conceptually precise and empirically valid
measures (e.g. of learning agility, motivation
to learn, cognitive ability, and ability to reg-
ulate emotions) could be administered. This
change would allow for not only an overall
summative measure of learning ability and a
general prediction of performance or poten-
tial but also an examination of the specific
factors driving the bulk of the explanatory
power and an understanding of how these
various factors interact with one another to
predict important leadership outcomes. As
De Meuse et al. note, learning agility is not
always a positive predictor of performance
in all contexts. This multimeasure, inter-
actional approach would allow a greater
understanding of when learning agility mat-
ters for performance and selection, as well
as how much it matters relative to other
attributes of a more general construct of
learning ability.
Old Wine in New Bottles or a Fresh
Vintage in Waiting?
Several responses characterized our con-
ceptualization of learning agility as nothing
more than ‘‘old wine in new bottles.’’ For
instance, Wang and Beier (2012) posit that
learning agility is a derivative of g, and
Arun, Coyle, and Hauenstein (2012) assert
that our conceptualization frames learn-
ing agility ‘‘in traditional cognitive ability
nomenclature.’’ The frequency with which
this issue arose in the responses tells us
that we failed to communicate our intent
adequately in the focal article. We do not
believe that learning agility is a purely cog-
nitive process. In fact, we think that the
learning agility construct is actually a nice
example of how applied organizational psy-
chology moves us beyond a pure cognitive
approach. That is, although we respect the
research that Arun et al. raised, we contend
that this purely cognitive approach, largely
established through laboratory experiments
and solely measuring what is going on
within one individual’s head, is inadequate
to capture what we mean by learning agility
as it occurs in organizational settings. When
individuals learn within an organizational
setting, it is an inherently contextualized
and interpersonal process. The learning
takes place in a context where meanings are
contested, at times politicized, frequently
rapidly changing, and often ambiguous,
sometimes intentionally so. Furthermore, in
organizations, individuals learn with and
from other individuals who frequently have
their own (often imperfect) sense of mean-
ing and try to shape interpretations based
on it. Learning in such settings requires risk
(e.g., the image risk of conveying that one
does not already know) and is accompa-
nied by real emotions (e.g., anxiety that one
cannot keep up or the dread created by
the implications of what one is discovering
through the learning process). We believe
that these realities make learning agility, as
well as the more general concept of learning
ability, much more complex than the intra-
personal and cognitive processes evident in
much of the existing research.
For example, consider a rapidly chang-
ing organizational setting. Rapid change
makes learning speed difficult as things
may be confusing or ambiguous as the
changes sort out. In such environments, the
flexibility aspect of agility becomes even
more important as individuals need to drop
some understandings and adopt others to
keep up. However, if these environments
are also politicized, learning flexibility also
becomes challenging. In politicized envi-
ronments, individuals become associated
with a point of view, and others, invested
in that point of view, expect them to exhibit
consistency over time. Dropping one les-
son of experience and adopting another
becomes much more difficult. Individuals
become caught in a web of expectations.
This brief example shows how our under-
standing of learning agility needs to be
much broader than pure cognition to cap-
ture learning as it occurs in organizations.
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Indeed, it is the nature of this organizational
milieu that may explain why prior research
has found that general mental ability does
not predict training transfer (Blume, Ford,
Baldwin, & Huang, 2010) or leadership
development (DeRue & Wellman, 2009)
in organizations. As Argyris (1991) noted,
it is often the smartest people who have
the hardest time learning in organizations.
Although it is left to future research to
fully describe and theorize about these pro-
cesses, we believe strongly that these pro-
cesses go beyond intrapersonal cognition.
We appreciate our responders’ comments
for prompting us to state this more clearly.
In addition to contending that our
conceptualization simply imported notions
of cognitive ability, Arun et al. (2012)
also contend that we did so incorrectly,
as we failed to embrace ‘‘the traditional
understanding of cognitive ability as a
disposition’’ that is biologically based and
fixed and cannot develop with experience
(as we suggest is true of learning agility).
On this point we disagree. We draw
our conceptualization of cognitive ability
from a tradition that recognizes cognitive
ability as mutable over time and through
educational intervention (even for adults;
Schaie, 1994). This perspective stands in
stark contrast to Arun et al., who note
that ‘‘such an argument [developing agility
from experience] implies that processing
speed, a biological-based specific aptitude,
improves from experience!’’ This tension in
the cognitive psychology literature suggests
that there is still much ambiguity regarding
cognitive ability itself, and perhaps, it is the
case that the ‘‘old wine’’ is actually still just
a field of grapes, waiting to be pressed and
fermented, let alone bottled or rebottled.
Jingle/Jangle and the Progression
of Understanding in I–O
Psychology
Hezlett and Kuncel (2012) comment that
we have committed both a jingle and
a jangle fallacy. These fallacies, first
noted in the 1800s and referenced sev-
eral times in the modern era, are related.
A ‘‘jingle’’ fallacy involves conflating
constructs that superficially appear simi-
lar but are fundamentally distinct, whereas
a ‘‘jangle’’ fallacy involves the presump-
tion that similar constructs with different
names are actually different (Block, 1995;
Kelley, 1927; Marsh, 1994). We understand
the issues here and also lament the pro-
liferation of constructs in our field (e.g.,
DeRue, Nahrgang, Wellman, & Humphrey,
2011). However, these fallacies typically
occur when independent researchers pay
no mind to existing constructs in the field
while inventing new ones. Independent
research streams emerge and confusion
ensues. We, on the other hand, are attempt-
ing to directly interact with authors about
their conceptualization. We are arguing for
the replacement of the current construct of
learning agility as it is conceptualized and
operationalized by Eichinger et al., with a
narrower definition that distinguishes it from
an overarching ability to learn.
In our minds, we have committed no
fallacy. Rather, we have engaged in a con-
scious attempt to aid the progression of our
understanding of a construct by proposing
a more careful conceptualization, label-
ing, and definition—one that will hope-
fully enable subsequent improved opera-
tionalizations and practical application of
the construct. To rule out or marginalize
efforts such as ours by labeling them a
fallacy of one ‘‘J-type’’ or another is to
set back progress in our field. Intellectual
fields progress through an active and vibrant
‘‘marketplace for ideas’’ in which scholars
introduce their best ideas, construct defi-
nitions and conceptualizations, and those
ideas are vetted by their colleagues. This
vetting happens within the scholarly pub-
lication process and through the rigorous
and provocative work presented at confer-
ences by both academics and practitioners.
The field is served by this lively debate
about what concepts mean and whether
they are needed. For example, consider the
discussions about the construct of employee
engagement that took place within several
SIOP meetings over the past decade. Prac-
titioners loved this new notion and many
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scholars wondered whether it differed from
motivation (e.g., Macey & Schneider, 2008).
Our field does not operate by a ‘‘first-come
first-served’’ notion of truth and utility in
which we always need to consider the first
definition on record as dogma. Rather, defi-
nitions can be (and in our minds should be)
contested over time as people with different
ideas interact with the original ideas and
embellish or refute them.
We believe that an error in concep-
tualization was made by Eichinger, Lom-
bardo, and colleagues when they decided to
rename learning ability as learning agility.
By labeling the whole construct (learning
ability) with what we believe is a part of the
construct (learning agility), they introduced
confusion. As such, when practitioners use
the Lombardo and Eichinger (2000) con-
ceptualization to state that a manager is
learning agile, it connotes a very specific
ability; but what is tested is a very broad set
of learning ability (and learning from expe-
rience) dimensions, as well as concepts that
are seemingly not part of the ability to learn.
Eichinger et al. had their reasons for relabel-
ing learning ability to learning agility, as De
Meuse et al. (2012) articulate: They didn’t
like the traditional association between the
phrase ‘‘learning ability’’ and a cognitive
approach that explains the mental process
of learning. They also did not like that ability
is often interpreted as intelligence. Although
we empathize with their frustration, we
do not think it is solved by calling one
thing another. Indeed, did they not commit
a jingle fallacy long before we are being
described as doing so? Learning ability has
a longstanding research tradition in our field
(Kolb, 1974; Woodrow, 1946). To rename
it ‘‘learning agility’’ and then to create a
measure of it as a more general learning
ability creates confusion both in the schol-
arly community and the world of practice.
Managers are most likely happy about
the positive correlations they can show
between learning agility and outcomes such
as performance. But we wonder—when
they really need an agile learner (as opposed
to someone who is a generally able learner
or a strong performer), would they ever
be able to find one using the current
measure? In addition, there are reasons to
be suspect of the positive correlations that
have been presented to date. As previously
stated, the Choices Architect® measure has
come to include aspects of performance in
the measure itself. Likewise, most of the
data presented to date suffer from common
method and source biases, and despite
De Meuse et al.’s (2012) claim, large
sample sizes do not reduce or reconcile
these biases. Given these measurement
and research design limitations, should we
be that surprised that current measures of
learning agility show positive associations
with employee performance and potential?
We hope this exchange is the impetus for
scholars and practitioners alike to enhance
the conceptual clarity of learning agility and
the rigor of our measurement and research
design, and together create a path forward
where we explore, debate, and discover the
merits of learning agility in today’s complex
and dynamic world.
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